The communication cost is a major issue of signature performance since signature transmission usually consumes more power than that of signature generation and verification. Signature aggregation is an important and commonly used technique to save communication bandwidth when transmitting signatures. NDN can adopt signature aggregation to achieve this type of signature compression.
ICNs are promising alternatives to current Internet architecture since the Internet struggles with a number of issues such as scalability, mobility, and security. ICN offers a number of potential benefits including reduced congestion and enhanced delivery performance by employing content caching, simpler network configurations, and stronger security for the content. NDN, an instance of ICN, enables content delivery instead of host-centric approaches by naming data rather than host. In order to make NDN practical in the real world, the challenging issues of content security need to be addressed. In this article, we examine the architecture and content security as well as possible solutions to these issues of NDN, with a special focus on the content integrity and provenance. We propose a variety of digital signature schemes to achieve the data integrity and origin authentication in NDN for various applications, which include cost-effective signatures, privacy preserving signatures, network coding signatures, and post-quantum signatures. We also present speed-up techniques in generating signatures and verifying signatures such as pre-computation, batch verification, and server-aided verification to reduce the computational cost of the producers and receivers in NDN. A number of certificate-free trust management approaches and possible adoptions in NDN are investigated.
IntroductIon
The Internet, a packet data network in which clients and servers with specific IP addresses can interact over a pre-established communication channel for conversion, has achieved great success since its invention 36 years ago. Internet users can transfer various content such as audio, text, image, and video packets over the Internet thanks to the well-known TCP/IP. The current Internet's hourglass architecture focuses on the IP network layer, in which the minimal functionality required for global interconnectivity is implemented. However, profound changes in the nature of Internet communication have taken place where massive contents are produced and distributed over the Internet. An increasing number of applications involving data delivery are concerned more about what data are required than from where the data come. Moreover, there are no built-in mechanisms supporting mobility and security in the Internet. Thus, it is fair to say that the Internet architecture poorly matches its primary use today in the sense that scalable content distribution is poorly served by the Internet.
The drawbacks of the Internet mentioned above have motivated people to find a promising alternative supporting content-centric communication to the Internet. Five projects for content-based Internet paradigms [1] under its Future Internet Architecture Program were funded by NSF, and named data networking (NDN) [2] is one of the projects. Different from IP, which centers on communication endpoints via their IP addresses, NDN does not utilize source and destination addresses but makes use of data packets with content names. NDN places data as the highest priority by naming them instead of their addresses. The employment of content names in NDN communication enables routers to monitor the states of the packets, which provides additional functions the IP routers cannot offer. The NDN packets are independent of their location, which supports in-network caching of contents for future use and supports a consumer with different positions inherently.
In the NDN project (named-data.net), NDN was described with a similar layered hourglass architecture [2] as that of the Internet except for a few different functions between corresponding network layers, as shown in Fig. 1 . To be more specific, first, the network service in the Internet delivers packets to a specified destination IP address, while it retrieves data with a unique defined name in NDN. The main overlays in NDN are named content chunks, while the fundamental element of the Internet is a channel between two endpoints with a unique IP address.
Second, there are two new layers named security and strategy in the NDN protocol stack. Tje security layer guarantees the security of content rather than the whole communication channel, while the strategy layer is for the NDN forwarding plane, where the functions of the Internet's transport layer are embedded. Hence, there is no need for separate transport layers in NDN.
ArchItecture of ndn
NDN adopts a hierarchical structure [2] , which is user friendly, to construct content names. Each name might consist of multiple parts: source of the content, file name, and version of the content;
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including name and incoming face information. After receiving the feedback Data packet with the exact-match name from another router, the router erases the corresponding record in the PIT and forwards the Data packet to the consumer through incoming face(s) information. Finally, the router stores a copy of the Data packet for future reuse, thus saving bandwidth and reducing the time consumption in data retrieval.
content-centrIc securIty chAllenges In ndn
NDN concentrates on information objects or contents retrieval from a network instead of the location of these contents [2] . Thus, securing the contents themselves in NDN is more important than protecting the infrastructure of the network. In NDN, content security is a challenge since there are a number of security concerns of NDN content including naming related attacks, caching related attacks, routing related attacks, and other attacks [3] . Watchlist and sniffing attacks are two types of naming related attacks. Different from TCP/IP, in which an address represents a host in the network and is not semantically related to the content, NDN names the content for facilitating data dissemination and routes the content based on the content names. This approach causes security risks as the content names are visible and semantically correlated to the content itself. Adversaries are able to monitor Internet usage with the visible content requests, which puts the NDN publisher's privacy in a worse situation. Moreover, denial of service may occur as an adversary can prevent NDN users from requesting the marked content, which leads to unanswered requests.
cAchIng relAted AttAcks
Content caching at intermediate nodes, which is also referred to as in-network storage, is fundamentally necessary to support peer-to-peer (P2P) data delivery in NDN at low communication cost. There are a number of benefits to using caching in NDN, such as dissociating contents from their producers, avoiding a single point of failure, reducing the network load and data dissemination latency, and so on. NDN is built on consumer-driven caching with the aim of delivering the closest copy available to a subscriber. Thus, NDN is vulnerable to caching related attacks including time analysis, caching pollution, and bogus announcements.
Time analysis can violate users' privacy by recognizing whether a user has requested a content or not. A caching pollution attack is one in which users will be served illegitimate content by a polluted cache once the cache has been poisoned by an attacker. In a bogus announcement attack, an adversary sends a mass of announcement updates for content at a frequency exceeding the local content request routing convergence time to damage the caching and routing systems. As a result, the overloaded bogus contents mean that the subscribers fail to retrieve complete or correct content.
routIng relAted AttAcks
In NDN, the content delivery heavily relies on asynchronous publication and subscription. Thus, some attacks such as jamming attack and time attack may come into being to violate this state consistency. There are other routing and forwarding related attacks such as flooding attack to exhaust resources such as memory and computational power, which are employed to maintain and exchange content states. Routing related attacks can lead to denial of service, resource exhaustion, path infiltration, and privacy leakage.
other AttAcks
There are some other attacks that do not fall into the aforementioned categories, which might cause insufficient or incorrect data distribution in NDN. In the packet mistreatment scenario, an adversary accesses NDN nodes to modify packets during transmission, reply to the consumer frequently, or pretend to be the publisher to create content. Unauthorized access attacks, which enable an adversary to access some content sent to legitimate users that he/she has no right to access, becomes easier as an adversary can use any available copy of a content distributed in different network locations. These attacks can lead to unauthorized access to content, congestion, denial of service, and so on.
ProtectIng content wIth dIgItAl sIgnAtures
As the cryptographic analog of handwritten signatures, digital signatures are a useful cryptographic primitive for authenticating an entity and validating the integrity of a message. As a fundamental security guarantee of NDN, a digital signature scheme is employed to sign the name of each NDN packet together with the packet content, which provides content integrity and origin authentication by binding the name and the data of the packet. This approach separates trust in content and in entities, which makes the globally addressable content publicly authenticated. A consumer who is the requester of some content can validate the signature, and a router can also choose to check the content integrity and provenance with the signature. Moreover, named and signed content forms a solid foundation for building a number of applications such as a web browser protocol handler and media streaming.
Finding appropriate digital signature schemes to secure NDN packets is challenging. First, to sign and validate every packet requires a heavy need for high efficiency in signature generation, verification, transmission, and storage. Second, a publisher's signatures on packets may leak his/her information such as his/her public key since this information is mandatory in signature verification. Third, when a quantum computer comes into being, it can break all digital signature schemes used today. What kind of digital signature algorithms can be used in NDN in the age of quantum computers? Finally, signature validation of NDN content only reveals that the signature was generated with a particular key; thus, key management [4, 5] becomes a fundamental issue in NDN content security. A digital signature scheme [6] usually involves a signer and a set of verifiers. The signer begins with a key generation algorithm to generate a key pair including a public key pk and a private key sk. With the key pair, a digital signature scheme allows the signer to sign a message m following the Sign algorithm to generate a digital signature on a message m such that a verifier who knows pk can use the corresponding Verify algorithm to validate that m is originated from the signer and remains pure.
Cost-Effective Digital Signatures: Choosing cost-effective fine-grained signature schemes to sign Internet packets is a major challenge for the publisher in an NDN. NDN currently offers two choices, Rivest, Shamir, & Adleman (RSA) [6] and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm ECDSA [7] , as signature algorithms.
Let p and q be two odd primes, and N is their product. A signer's public key is e and its private key is d where the product of d and e is congruent to 1 modulo, the value of Euler's phi function.
To generate a signature of message m, the signer first computes the hash value of m and then the signature of m, which is the hash value to the power of d. A verifier checks if the hash value of m equals the signature value of m to verify a signature. When one uses a 1024-bit modulus, the size of an RSA signature is 1024 bits, which might be too long to be employed in NDN content verification.
g denotes a generator of a group G of prime order q, and h is an arbitrary element of G. The discrete logarithm of h with respect to g is defined as the smallest non-negative integer x such that h equals the value of g to the power of x. Discrete logarithm assumption says that it is hard to find the integer x given g and h. A number of cost-effective digital signature schemes have been proposed based on discrete logarithm assumption, and the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA), the core of the Digital Signature Standard (DSS), is among the representative signature algorithms. When one uses a 1024-bit modulus, a DSA signature is 320 bits long. ECDSA, the variant of DSA based on elliptic curve, is 320 bits long as well.
Another cost-effective digital signature is the Boneh, Lynn, and Shacham (BLS) short signature from the Weil pairing [6] . A BLS signature is approximately 170 bits long, and it offers a security level similar to that of a 320-bit DSA signature. The unforgettability of a BLS signature depends on the CDH assumption on some elliptic curves over a finite field.
Privacy-Preserving Digital Signatures: Digital signatures can bind content to its publisher;, however, ordinary cost-effective signatures are publicly verifiable, which may leak sensitive identity information of the publisher. The privacy disclosure of a publisher's identity is dangerous in NDN, especially when considering censorship and monitoring since an adversary is able to identify the content from certain publishers easily from the public key explicitly stated at every NDN packet. We introduce two types of privacy-preserving digital signatures, group signature and ring signature, to protect signature privacy, where the identity of the publisher can be hidden among a group of users. Different from traditional digital signature schemes where only one signer is involved, group signatures [8] can conceal the identity of the signer with a group of members such that the verifier can be convinced that the signer is in the group but the real identity of the signer is unknown. In a group signature, a group manager is involved to build the group, and add and revoke group members. The property of signer ambiguity makes group signature an important building block in a variety of applications where identity privacy is a concern. Group signatures can be applied to NDN to protect a publisher's identity privacy, but the presence of a trusted group manager limits group signatures to settings with collaborating publishers.
Collaboration between signers is not always possible, so ring signature [9] , a simplified group signature, can provide an ad hoc group with no trusted group manager. Ring signatures can provide unconditional 1-out-of-n anonymity. Besides, ring signatures satisfy spontaneity and unlinkability. The property of spontaneity of ring signature refers to the unawareness of other members involved in the ring. Unlinkability states that two signatures generated by the same signer cannot be linked in any possible way. In ring signatures, singers can choose other users at will to form a ring, which is more practical to implement for an NDN publisher due to no need to manage a group. Two challenges are posed if ring signatures are applied to protect an NDN publisher's identity privacy: how to trace a malicious publisher for poisonous content and censorship might still be possible if using a small ring. The potential solutions are employing an accountable ring signature and a bigger ring.
Network Coding Signatures: NDN takes advantage of the traditional "store and forward" paradigm in the network. To increase the handling ability of the network and improve robustness against random faults in an NDN, we can integrate network coding [10] with NDN, since intermediate nodes in NDN have a certain storage and computing ability. Homomorphic signature [11] can be applied to an NDN with network coding. When an Interest packet comes to an NDN producer, the producer divides the corresponding data into an ordered sequence of n-dimensional vectors. Before they are transmitted to the network, the producer generates m augmented vectors by concatenating an m-bit-long vector with every original vector v i , which contains "1" only at the ith point and "0" at the other positions. Thus, the linear combination coefficients are included in the right-most m positions. Then the augmented vectors are sent to the NDN consumer together with the producer's signatures. Routers in NDN can linearly combine the data packet produced by the same producer as well as their signatures due to the homomorphic property of the signature. Finally, the consumer is able to retrieve the original data from sufficiently random linear combinations in a full rank matrix.
Post-Quantum Digital Signatures: Quantum computers can solve some computationally intractable mathematical problems efficiently, like the factoring problem and discrete logarithm problem. That is, the classical digital signature algorithms used today are no longer secure in the quantum computer era and thus cannot be used in NDN. Fortunately, there are still some mathe- 
sIgnAture ImPlementAtIon
In this section, we show the implementations of the selected digital signatures, including RSA [6] , DSA [6] , BLS [6] , ECDSA [7] , a group signature [8] , and a ring signature [9] .
Environment: All the algorithms are conducted on a desktop with 64-bit Win 10 operating system and 16.0 GB RAM. The processor is Intel® Core™ i7-7700 CPU @3.6 GHz. We implement the programs in C++ projects with the help of the interfaces in the Miracl library (https://certivox. org/display/EXT/MIRACL) to realize the operations in big integers and elliptic curve groups and compile the projects in VS 2010.
Parameters: The parameters in the implemented algorithms are fixed with the reference of ANSI X9 and Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS 186-4, 2013 -FIPS PUB 186-4: Federal information processing standards publication, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), NIST, 2013; http://dx. doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-4; accessed July 2013), a golden standard of digital signatures by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). NIST and American National Standards Institute (ANSI) X9 have set the minimum key length requirement, in which RSA and DSA are 1024 bits, and ECC is 160 bits, with the equivalent security of the corresponding symmetric block cipher, a key length of 80 bits. The concrete settings are specified as follows. For RSA, we set the module N 1024 bits, p and q 512 bits, which satisfies |p -q| > 2 412 For DSA, p and q are selected to be 1024 bits and 160 bits, respectively. For ECDSA, we employ a pseudo-random curve over prime field GF(p) where a is -3 and the cofactor is 1, which is one of the recommended elliptic curves by NIST for federal government use (https://csrc. nist.gov/projects/digital-signatures). For BLS, we select Miyaji-Nakabayashi-Takano (MNT) nonsupersingular curves [12] , in which the embedding degree is 6 and the cofactor is 2. Both group signature and ring signature are DL-based, which can share the parameters in DSA. The sizes of the group and ring are fixed as 5.
Implementation Results: To test the KeyGen, Sign, and Verify algorithms of each scheme, we repeat each algorithm 1000 times and get the average running time. The result is shown in Fig 5. In KeyGen, the most expensive scheme is group signature with 4.059 ms time consumption, whereas ring signature, with the same number of users, only costs 0.599 ms, which is almost the same magnitude as DSA. It takes the least for RSA to generate a key pair. As for ECC-based BLS and ECDSA, the running time is 2.400 ms and 1.890 ms, respectively. In the Sign scheme, ring signature costs the most time of 4.575 ms, followed by RSA at 3.274 ms. The other four schemes are all ms-level. For Verify, the ring signature is the most time-consuming one at 6.869 ms, followed by BLS 4.600 ms, group signature 3.050 ms, ECDSA 2.000 ms, DSA 1.869 ms, and RSA 1.274 ms.
enhAncIng dIgItAl sIgnAtures' PerformAnce
We introduce some techniques to enhance the performance of digital signatures from three aspects, namely speeding up the signature generation, speeding up the signature verification, and reducing the bandwidth of digital signatures.
Speeding Up Signature Generation: Pre-computation is an important and widely used technique to make the signature generation faster. Online/offline signatures were proposed, aiming to improve the signature generation by computing a signature in two phases: offline phase (before the message to be signed is presented) and online phase (after the message to be signed is given). Shamir et al. [13] presented an efficient approach by using a trapdoor hash function such as chameleon hash. With this transformation, any signature scheme is able to be transformed into a highly efficient online/offline signature, and the signature size does not increase too much.
Speeding Up Signature Verification: The verification cost of a digital signature is likely a more important factor than that of signature generation as a digital signature is generated once but may be verified many times. Batch verification and server-aided verification are two kinds of techniques to significantly reduce the signature verification time. Batch verification [14] enables a verifier to take less time in validating multiple digital signatures simultaneously than the overall time for all single signature verifications.
Various digital signatures such as RSA, ECDSA, and BLS signatures have got their batch verification algorithms. Some algorithms support batch verification for the signatures from the same signer, while a few algorithms allow batch verification for many different signers. Server-aided verification can speed up the signature verification by delegating a substantial part of computations to a powerful but possibly untrusted server. The computational cost of signature verification such as BLS signature can be decreased by around 70 percent with server-aided verification. Reducing Signature Bandwidth: The communication cost is a major issue of signature performance since signature transmission usually consumes more power than that of signature generation and verification. Signature aggregation is an important and commonly used technique to save communication bandwidth when transmitting signatures. NDN can adopt signature aggregation to achieve this type of signature compression. A publisher signs n distinct packets and obtains n signatures on these packets, and then aggregates all the signatures into a single signature, which can convince a consumer that the publisher signed the n packets. A number of digital signatures such as RSA signature and BLS signature can be aggregated.
trust mAnAgement
A valid signature on an NDN content only indicates that this signature was indeed generated with a particular key, and trust management is mandatory to make this knowledge useful. Hierarchical public key infrastructure (PKI) has been built, but suffers from usability problems in the previous research on trust management in networks. To authenticate a public key, a digital certificate, a digitally signed statement binding the identity of an entity and its public key, is employed in PKI. However, PKI-based trust management has received a lot of criticism due to its complexity of supporting certificates.
Some certificate-free trust management approaches can be potential solutions to address the NDN trust management issue. We introduce four paradigms of certificate-free trust management mechanisms briefly: self-certified trust management, identity-based trust management, certificateless trust management, and certificate-based trust management. The trick of self-certified trust management is that the public key is jointly generated by the signer and the authority such that the certificate is embedded in the public key itself. Public keys in identity-based trust management are derived directly from user identities such as email address and IP address, while the private key is generated by a trusted third party. The elimination of certificates in identity-based trust management brings a number of benefits including no certificate lookup, no certificate management, no certificate revocation, and so on. The disadvantage of this approach is key escrow, that is, the trusted third party knows the private keys of all users. Certificateless and certificate-based trust management can reduce the trust levels of the trusted third party in identity-based trust management as in these systems, the full public key of a user is based on a user-generated public key component and the user's identity, while the full private key is created from a user-generated private key component and the private key component generated by the semi-trusted third party. Recently, blockchain-based PKI has attracted some attention, and Emercoin (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emercoin), a blockchain-based cryptocurrency that storages different public key types, has been developed.
conclusIon
In this article, we investigate content integrity and provenance in NDN and conclude that digital signature is a fundamental and essential tool to address this issue. We introduce diverse digital signatures to achieve content integrity and origin authentication in NDN for various scenarios. We also propose different techniques to speed up signature generation and verification to make signatures practical in NDN. Several types of certificate-free trust management are introduced as well to manage the keys of signature schemes. Our future research is to deploy these signatures and techniques in the real-world NDN environment.
